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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD A. RICHE, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
NORTH OGDEN PROFESSIONAL 
CORPORATION, a Utah 
Professional Corporation, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Case No. 20477 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented by this Appeal by Appellant 
are: 
1. That the Appellant (Corporation) had the 
right to the redemption of its stock by virtue of 
a Stock Redemption Agreement and by reason of the 
restriction of transfer of corporate stock in Article 
XII of the Articles of Incorporation. 
2. That the Respondent was a disqualified person 
to hold shares in a Medical Professional Corporation, 
in that the Respondent is not a licensed medical practi-
tioner. 
3. That the Respondent is barred by the statute 
of limitations in seeking a liquidation and dissolution 
of the Corporation, 
The issues presented on appeal by Respondent 
are: 
4. That the appeal should be dismissed for 
the reason that the interlocutory order is not a final 
order from which an appeal can be taken. 
5* That the Statute of Limitations has run 
against the Corporation in exercising the right of 
redemption. 
6. That the Respondent should be permitted 
to liquidate the Corporation and take all the receivables 
since the date of the filing of bankruptcy for purposes 
of the liquidation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant/Appellant, a professional Corporation, 
employed Dr. Richard E. Nilsson, who was a stockholder. 
Dr. Nilsson filed bankruptcy, first Chapter 13, and 
then Chapter 7, in 1976. Thereafter, the bankruptcy 
court sold the shares of stock in the Corporation. 
Plaintiff/Respondent purchased the stock and, because 
he was not a qualified person, sought to dissolve 
the Corporation. The trial court determined that 
the Plaintiff/Respondent was the owner of the stock 
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and ruled that the Corporation had not redeemed the 
stock within the contract or statutory period. The 
court further ruled that the parties should proceed 
to liquidation of the Corporation. Defendant appealed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
PURPOSE OF SUIT FOR DISSOLUTION 
To recover value of investment. 
Since owner of the stock was not a professional , 
the only alternative was to dissolve the Corporation 
and take out the real value. 
The amount of the assets of the Corporation were 
reflected in the income not in the property of par 
value. Since the Corporation owned the accounts receiv-
able, the real value was the income generated by the 
employee doctors over the years. 
Present value of the accounts receivable would 
approximate 400,000 of which Plaintiff/Respondent 
would own 49.75%. This is but one of the assets to 
be distributed in the dissolution. 
The case is not complete. No dissolution has 
yet occurred. The appeal is premature and should 
be disallowed. 
The Statute of Limitations has not run, for the 
contract was an executory contract and the statute 
would not begin to run until the onset of the execution 
3 
of the contract. Here, where the right to redeem 
did not commence until the time for sale, (Rl), no 
claim can be made that the statute of limitations 
had run. The commencement of the lawsuit for purposes 
of dissolution was well within the statutory period 
of the right of redemption. (July 15, 1983, R4) . 
Said commencement of suit tolls the running of the 
statute since liquidation is an alternative to redemption 
under the terms of the contract and the statute (16-
11-13) . 
To argue that the statute began to run at the 
date of the filing of bankruptcy, which Appellant 
seems to be doing, is to argue that the stock was 
available for redemption by Appellant at the time 
of bankruptcy. Not so, the asset was in the hands 
of the trustee who did not offer it for sale until 
1982. At the time of the sale by the trustee the 
ninety (90) days began to run. When no redemption 
occurred during that period the statute of limitations 
on dissolution (or liquidation) began. (R441, line 
21-25). The suit was commenced some thirteen (13) 
months later. Note that the statute, 16-11-13, UCA 
1953, requires the fair market value of the shares 
of stock must be paid. The trustee was not obligated 
to sell for par. The price of sale was not the fair 
market value, for said value must be fixed at the 
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time of liquidation. For the purposes of this Appeal, 
Respondent alleges that the fair market value is the 
value of the stock, leasehold, equipment and, of greatest 
worth, all of the retained profit in the form of accounts 
receivable for the years from the date of purchase 
or bankruptcy until the time of dissolution (liquidation) . 
Nilsson continued to be an employee of the Corporation 
after his bankruptcy. His earnings belonged to the 
Corporation and he received a salary (R444, line 19-
20). All expenses were paid by the Corporation from 
the receivables. Dr. Nilsson owned 49.+ percent of 
the assets of the Corporation. At sale, his interest 
passed to the owner of the shares, which Respondent 
makes no claim that the Corporation can continue with 
him as the professional, yet he can and does claim 
that either through purchase or liquidation he is 
entitled to 49.+ percent of the assets, including 
the receivables. 
Appellant raises the statute of limitation as 
an affirmative defense and sets the time for the commence-
ment of the statute at the time of the disqualification 
of the doctor. The facts ring loudly against that 
premise. Dr. Nilsson continued to work as a physician; 
he continued to assert an ownership in the Corporation 
until the date of the actual sale of the stock. Until 
that date, the stock was not owned by a "disqualified" 
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shareholder. Nilsson had not died; he had not retired; 
he had simply placed his stock in the hands of the 
bankruptcy trustee who exercised no control nor ownership 
over said stock until the date of sale. The Appellant 
cannot claim a right which did not exist under the 
agreement or the statutes until the substitution of 
Respondent for Nilsson. That occurred on the date 
of sale. (September 20, 1982) (R75). Indeed, the 
shares of stock were not transferred to Respondent 
until the commencement of the suit, subject to this 
appeal, as per the order of the bankruptcy judge, 
dated November 9, 1982, (R77). Under the terms of 
the redemption agreement and under the statute, dis-
qualification does not occur until: (1) sale (R57), 
(2) termination of employment or, (3) death. Since 
Nilsson continues to be employed (has not died) the 
qualifier in this case is "sale." The restrictions 
of the sale are such that the company may, prior to 
any such sale, redeem said stock at par value. (R59). 
Note: "prior to any such sale . . . ." Since the 
sale was unique and Appellant takes the position that 
the Statute of Limitations had already run on the 
legal exercise of their rights or the rights of the 
trustee, the entire redemption concept was passe1. 
If the Statute of Limitations had run, then no disqualifi-
cation of Respondent could occur; no right of redemption 
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could occur except as set by the legislature, 16-
11-13, UCA. 
Nilsson was not disqualified until he lost his 
shares by sale to Respondent. If, as the Appellant 
would have us believe, the statute commenced to run 
as of the date of the filing of bankruptcy, then the 
right of redemption, the entire agreement under which 
the Appellant claims ownership of the stock, was outlawed 
by the statute of limitations in 1980. Since a sale 
did not occur until October 19, 1982, the disqualifica-
tions, under the redemption provisions of the statute 
(16-11-13, UCA), did not occur until the sale. Certainly 
the claim by the Appellant that the trustee became 
the owner of the shares cannot stand. Ownership, 
under the terms of the agreement, statute, or common 
law, came about only by purchase. All legal proceedings 
under contemplation or under way are stayed by the 
filing of bankruptcy. 
See §454, Bankruptcy, 9 Am Jur 2d, where it is 
said, 
Thus, the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 provides 
for an automatic stay of virtually all activities 
adversely affecting the debtor or debtor's 
property. To insure that prejudice resulting 
from this stay are minimized, the code also 
provides for relief from the stays and for 
a tolling of limitation which might otherwise 
cause the availability of the stayed remedies 
to lapse. 
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Certainly, the bankruptcy act may not be used 
to defeat claims by permitting a debtor to stay proceedings 
and then escape said proceedings by saying at the 
propitious time, "I'll dismiss my bankruptcy action, 
for the Statute of Limitations has now run on your 
claim." This seems to be the obvious claim by the 
Appellant here. 
On the other hand, if the statute did run, the 
right of redemption asserted in the statute and the 
private agreement is moot since no offer of redemption 
was made within ninety (90) days. Thus, Judge Wahlquist 
was correct in his finding that the order was interlocutory 
and there remains the necessity of liquidation or 
dissolution which the lawsuit is all about. (R3). 
POINT TWO 
APPELLANT HAD RIGHT TO REDEMPTION OF SHARES 
OF STOCK PREVIOUSLY ISSUED TO A QUALIFIED 
HOLDER. 
A p p e l l a n t had a r i g h t t o r e d e e m . Of t h a t t h e r e 
c a n b e no q u e s t i o n . S a i d r i g h t was c r e a t e d u n d e r 
t h e s t a t u t e ( 1 6 - 1 1 - 1 3 ) and under a p r i v a t e a g r e e m e n t . 
I n each c a s e , t h e r e d e m p t i o n p e r i o d was n i n e t y ( 9 0 ) 
d a y s . Arguendo n i n e t y (90) days from d a t e of b a n k r u p t c y 
( J u l y 9 , 1976, August 2 , 1976) (R159) , o r n i n e t y (90) 
d a y s f rom s a l e t o R e s p o n d e n t ( S e p t e m b e r 2 0 , 1 9 8 2 ) , 
( R 7 5 ) . A p p e l l a n t d i d n o t a t t e m p t t o r e d e e m w i t h i n 
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either period. (R355, line 8-17, R403, line 19-24, 
R406) . 
Since no exercise of that right was made within 
the ninety (90) day period, either of transfer to 
the trustee or sale to Respondent, Appellant cannot 
now be heard to assert a right which was limited to 
ninety (90) days, both by the private agreement and 
by statute. If such a right existed, it has long 
since been extinguished by operation of law. 
POINT THREE 
A STOCK REPURCHASE AGREEMENT IS NOT AN UNREASON-
ABLE RESTRAINT ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY. 
If a stock repurchase agreement sets a value 
and a limit as to its exercise, there can be no doubt 
that such an agreement is not a restraint of trade. 
The statute fixes a date of such redemption at bargain 
and fixes said redemption date as ninety (90) days 
from sale or disqualification. If no exercise is 
made of the bargain purchase, then the statute says 
that the liquidation of the Corporation is the only 
alternative. "if the Corporation shall fail to purchase 
said shares by the end of said ninety (90) days, then 
. . . any disqualified shareholder may bring an action 
. . . to order the liquidation of the Corporation." (16-
11-13, UCA). This the Respondent has done. 
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The liquidation (dissolution) has yet to occur 
and thus the Supreme Court should remand to the District 
Court for dissolution or liquidation. 
POINT FOUR 
APPELLANT ALLEGES THAT AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
OF AN EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL, WAIVER AND RES 
JUDICATA ARE DETERMINATIVE IN DENIAL OF 
CAUSE OF ACTION IN RESPONDENT. 
Certainly, Respondent has not waivered in his 
determination to liquidate the Corporation, acquire 
such assets as he might and obtain what he could not 
obtain by reason of the bankruptcy action by the Appel-
lant, As a result of the bankruptcy filing, Respondent 
lost a substantial amount of money. As a result of 
his dogged persistence in purchase of shares, attempts 
to liquidate and obtain his share of his Corporation, 
he is not guilty of any act giving rise to estoppel. 
At the time of the purchase of the shares, confirmed 
by the Court in November, 1982, Respondent waited 
until appeal time ran (from Judge Mabey's ruling) 
until redemption time ran, and until efforts to settle 
on an amicable basis with his fellow shareholders 
and then filed his suit to dissolve. Judge Mabey 
suggested just such an activity in his transfer of 
the issue relating to the entitlement of said stock 
itself to the court wherein litigation may be commenced 
between the parties. 
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The issue of estoppel, failure to file briefs, 
or other arguments counsel raises as to Respondent's 
obtaining of the stock were settled by Judge Mabey 
in the November 1982 Order on Order to Show Cause. (76-
77). Those issues were raised in the hearing before 
Judge Mabey and disposed of by the Judge. 
The issues presented by this appeal by Respondent 
are: 
POINT FIVE 
THAT THE APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR 
THE REASON THAT THE ORDER I S NOT A FINAL 
ORDER FROM WHICH AN APPEAL CAN BE TAKEN. 
As s e t f o r t h i n J u d g e W a h l q u i s t 1 s r u l i n g , d a t e d 
J a n u a r y 2 5 , 1 9 8 5 , ( R 3 3 2 ) J u d g e W a h l q u i s t v i e w e d t h e 
o r d e r s a s i n t e r m e d i a t e o r d e r s a n d n o t t h e r e f o r e a p p e a l a b l e . 
POINT SIX 
THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD RUN 
AGAINST THE CORPORATION IN EXERCISING THE 
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION. 
S i n c e o n t h e d a t e o f t h e f i l i n g o f b a n k r u p t c y , 
t h e o w n e r s h i p o f s t o c k p a s s e d t o t h e t r u s t e e i n b a n k r u p t c y 
t h e s i x y e a r s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n ( 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 3 , UCA) 
w r i t t e n i n s t r u m e n t s a n d t h e i r e n f o r c e m e n t b e g a n t o 
r u n a g a i n s t t h e C o r p o r a t i o n . 
S u c h s t a t u t e w a s n o t t o l l e d b y t h e b a n k r u p t c y 
a g a i n s t t h e C o r p o r a t i o n , o n l y a g a i n s t t h e b a n k r u p t . 
T h u s , t h e C o r p o r a t i o n h a d a maximum o f s i x y e a r s t o 
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exercise the option granted under the written agreement. 
Since no effort was made to redeem during that period, 
the Corporation lost its right to redeem under the 
written instrument or contract. Under the statute, 
the right to redeem was lost ninety (90) days after 
the stock was passed to a disqualified stockholder. (16-
11-13, UCA). 
POINT SEVEN 
THAT THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE PERMITTED 
TO LIQUIDATE THE CORPORATION AND TAKE ALL 
RECEIVABLES SINCE THE DATE OF THE FILING 
OF BANKRUPTCY FOR PURPOSES OF THE LIQUIDATION. 
Since the suit from which this appeal is taken 
is for the dissolution (liquidation) of a professional 
corporation, and since the issue on appeal seems to 
be only that the stock could be redeemed at par, the 
observe of that issue is which is the "fair" value 
of the stock for purposes of liquidation as set forth 
in 16-11-13. The fair value concept, as contemplated 
by the statute, had to do with the total value of 
the Corporation. Such liquidation is governed by 
procedured means of establishing value. Par is not 
the price; fair value establishes the price or what 
is available for distribution after liquidation as 
set forth in 16-10-92 and 16-10-93, UCA. 
The statute further provides that in the dissolution 
of a corporation, the property and assets remaining, 
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after payment of claims and debts# shall be distributed 
to its shareholders. Strict accounting of all property 
and assets must occur from the time Nilsson was first 
disqualified (the date of filing bankruptcy) until 
the date of liquidation. No other action would satisfy 
the statute with respect to dissolution. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Wahlquist stated that the orders and decree 
from which this appeal is taken were intermediate 
and that the matter was not yet ripe for appeal. 
Appellant claims that the court was wrong in ratifying 
the sale by the bankruptcy court and that, further, 
Plaintiff/Respondent had no claim on the Corporation 
beyond the par value of the stock. The trial court 
correctly analyzed the relationship between the parties 
and ordered further proceedings to result in a liquidation 
of the Corporation. Respondent now suggests that 
this Court should uphold Judge Wahlquist's ruling 
and return the matter to the District Court for dissolution 
and liquidation.
 w 
Respectfully submitted this (& day of June, 
1985. 
JOHN Vf. SAMPSON, ESQ. ' 
2650 Washington Boulevard 
Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
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Certificate of Mailing 
Comes now counsel for the Plaintiff and Respondent 
and certified to the Court that ten (10) copies of 
the Respondent's Brief were posted or delivered to 
the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, 
332 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
and that four copies were mailed Defendant and Appellant, 
by posting same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
and addressed to Pete N. Vlahos, 2447 Kiesel Avenue, 
Ogden, Utah 84401, this (p day of June, 1985. 
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